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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
These consolidated cases arise under the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2006), and the federal common law of nui-
sance. District courts have original jurisdiction over all cases aris-
ing under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
Appellants filed a timely appeal from a final judgment entered by
a federal district court. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction. Id.
§ 1291.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the grant or denial of summary judgment is de
novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Wolf v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judg-
ment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The appellate court must determine,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law. Kees v. Wallerstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th
Cir. 1998).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Does section 115 of the Clean Air Act require the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to notify New Union that it must re-
duce emissions from the power plants to the extent made possible
by available control technology?
II. Does the Trail Smelter doctrine require the United States
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to the extent allowed by availa-
ble control technology?
III. If the Clean Air Act does not apply, can the federal com-
mon law of nuisance be applied to carbon dioxide emissions in the
wake of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee?
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IV. Should the precautionary principle be considered when
balancing benefits and harms in a nuisance analysis?
V. Should the Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.
rule be applied if a public nuisance relating to carbon dioxide is
found under either federal or state law?
VI. Is the harm to Inuksuk and Akuli sufficiently concrete to
bring a nuisance action?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Province of Inuksuk and the Village of Akuli brought suit
for public nuisance against Genergy Corp., Atomic Energy, Inc.,
Centennial Power Co., Power Suppliers Co., and First Energy,
Ltd. (collectively, "power companies"). Inuksuk also brought suit
against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") seeking en-
forcement of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Record ("R.") at 1. The
court below consolidated these cases and granted summary judg-
ment for the power companies and the EPA on all issues. R. at 2.
First, the court ruled that there is no federal common law of nui-
sance for air pollution. R. at 8. Second, the court found that harm
resulting from global warming is too speculative to make out a
claim under the common law of New Union. Id. Third, the court
held that the EPA properly exercised its discretion in declining to
require that New Union revise its State Implementation Plan
("SIP"). R. at 11. The court declined to consider the United
States' Trail Smelter obligations. R. at 12.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Inuksuk is a northern province of Canada. R. at 4.
It has fourteen villages, Appellant Akuli being the largest. Id.
The villages are small and are not linked by roads. Id. The inhab-
itants, ninety percent of whom are Inuit, rely on sea ice not only to
travel between villages but to support their subsistence, hunting-
and-gathering lifestyle. R. at 5.
Anthropogenic greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide,
are accumulating in the Earth's atmosphere, causing air and
ocean temperatures to rise. R. at 6. There is thirty-two percent
more carbon dioxide presently in the atmosphere than there has
been at any time in the past 400,000 years. R. at 6. The five Ap-
pellee power companies are the largest emitters of carbon dioxide
in the United States. Id. Emissions from their New Union power
2007] 569
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plants are responsible for at least five percent of all anthropogenic
carbon dioxide released annually worldwide. Id.
A study conducted by hundreds of scientists under the aus-
pices of the International Climate Change Research Panel ("IC-
CRP"), a duly constituted international agency, concluded that the
Arctic region is experiencing the most rapid and severe climate
change on Earth. R. at 6. In the early 1990s, hunters from Akuli
began to notice that the sea ice persisted for less time each year
than it had previously. R. at 5. The loss of sea ice has been ac-
companied by increased erosion and severe flooding. Id. A study
of Inuksuk conducted by the Inuit Commission, a duly constituted
international agency ("Inuksuk study"), predicts that rising tem-
peratures will cause further erosion of Inuksuk's coastline as a
result of lost sea ice, increased flooding, and the loss of fisheries
and habitat for game animals upon which the Inuit depend. R at
5-6. The Inuksuk study indicates that the current pace of flooding
will destroy major portions of Akuli within three years. R. at 5.
Additionally, the Inuksuk study agrees with most climate scien-
tists' conclusion that global warming caused by increased carbon
dioxide emissions is causing "widespread thawing" of permafrost,
including the permafrost upon which eighty percent of Akuli is
built. Id. Such thawing causes slumping of the soil, landslides,
and severe erosion. Id.
Akuli is faced with relocating the entire village to higher
ground at a cost of $260 million (U.S.). Id. Additionally, individ-
ual citizens of Akuli have suffered harms from the destruction of
property, loss of native lifestyle, and interruption of business. R.
at 6.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The EPA has a mandatory duty to require that New Union
revise its SIP because carbon dioxide is a pollutant reasonably
likely to damage the public welfare. The CAA does not allow the
EPA the discretion to decline regulation once an air pollutant
emitted in the United States has been demonstrated to harm ei-
ther the citizens of this or a foreign nation.
The Trail Smelter doctrine applies to this case because the
harm to Inuksuk and Akuli is of a serious magnitude and has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Trail Smelter ac-
cords with the CAA by recommending that carbon dioxide emis-
sions be reduced to levels that can be achieved through the
application of current technology.
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If this Court will not require the EPA to obey the mandate set
out by the CAA to regulate the air pollutant carbon dioxide, there
is no preemption and the federal common law of nuisance is prop-
erly applied. It is a function of the federal common law to fill the
interstices that regulatory schemes fail to address. Further, as a
true interstate dispute, the instant case requires the application
of the federal common law.
As a rule of customary international law, the precautionary
principle is part of the federal common law and is binding on the
United States. The principle should be included in a nuisance bal-
ancing analysis. All of the preconditions necessary for the princi-
ple's application are present, and consideration of the
precautionary principle will protect the reasonable expectations of
Canadian citizens when balancing the equities.
The harm suffered by Inuksuk and Akuli is sufficiently con-
crete to provide standing for a suit in nuisance. The EPA and the
power companies' conduct has caused significant cognizable harm
to Inuksuk and Akuli's recognized interests. Moreover, the harm
is indivisible, and the power companies are jointly and severally
liable for the harms they have caused.
ARGUMENT
I. THE EPA HAS A MANDATORY DUTY TO
REQUIRE THAT NEW UNION REVISE ITS
STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN BECAUSE
CARBON DIOXIDE IS A POLLUTANT
REASONABLY LIKELY TO DAMAGE THE PUBLIC
WELFARE
The 1970 amendments to the CAA were passed "to protect
and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to pro-
mote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of
its population." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). Section 115 of the
Act explicitly grants protection to foreign countries harmed by
emissions generated in the United States. Id. § 7415. Rather
than providing a limited list of pollutants subject to regulation,
Congress broadly defined the reach of the Act and left the precise
constitution of regulated emissions to the EPA. See id. §§ 7408,
7602(g). This tasks the EPA with collecting and analyzing data to
determine which pollutants are reasonably likely to endanger the
public welfare. See id. § 7415(a). The Administrator of the EPA
("Administrator") has limited discretion, taking into account the
20071
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available data from "reports, surveys, or studies," to determine
whether a pollutant is harmful enough to warrant regulation. Id.
However, when a pollutant demonstrably endangers the public
welfare, the Administrator has a mandatory duty to issue regula-
tions limiting its harm by requiring states emitting the pollutant
to revise their SIPs to limit its release. Her Majesty the Queen in
Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The evidence linking anthropogenic carbon dioxide to global
warming is clear: "Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's
atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise." Comm.
on the Science of Climate Change, Nat'l Research Council, Cli-
mate Change Science: An Analysis of Some of the Key Questions 1
(National Academy Press 2001) ("NRC Report"). A recent report
by the ICCRP concluded that the Arctic region is experiencing
particularly rapid and severe climate change. R. at 6. The EPA
agrees with Inuksuk and Akuli that it is more likely than not that
global warming is responsible for the harms suffered by the citi-
zens of Inuksuk generally and Akuli in particular. R. at 7.
Nevertheless, the Administrator argues that the EPA need
not enforce the clear mandate of the CAA. R. at 2. The court be-
low erred when it agreed with the Administrator that regulation
of carbon dioxide is a political question. R. at 11. Nor is reliance
on Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., which was brought
under the common law of nuisance, applicable to claims falling
under the CAA - even if the decisions of the Southern District of
New York were binding on this Court. See 406 F. Supp. 2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). Rather, the instant case presents a mundane is-
sue easily addressed by the courts, namely whether the EPA has
complied with the CAA. It has not. The EPA has disregarded fed-
eral law and has failed to carry out its duty to regulate carbon
dioxide in the face of convincing scientific evidence that anthropo-
genic carbon dioxide is causing harm to the health and welfare of
the public.
A. The EPA Has the Authority to Regulate Carbon
Dioxide as a Pollutant.
This Court should conclude that Congress has granted the
EPA authority, through the CAA, to regulate the emission of car-
bon dioxide. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
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given effect." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). The inquiry "begins, as always,
with the plain language of the statute in question." Consumer
Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The CAA
defines a "pollutant" as "any physical, chemical, biological, radio-
active ... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Carbon dioxide, a
physical and chemical substance produced by the combustion of
coal in the power companies' plants and emitted into the ambient
air by their smokestacks, clearly falls within tAis straightforward
and expansive definition. The "plain language" of section 115 of
the CAA empowers the EPA to regulate "any air pollutant" that
contributes to the endangerment of the public welfare, either in
the United States or a foreign country. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (empha-
sis added).
B. The Clean Air Act Requires the EPA to Consider the
Balance of Scientific Evidence, Not Broad Policy,
When Determining Whether a Pollutant
Contributes to the Endangerment of the Public
Welfare.
The EPA's analysis of whether an air pollutant contributes to
the endangerment of the public welfare is bounded by limits set
out by Congress in the CAA. See Natural Res. Def Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the EPA's dis-
cretionary judgment must be grounded by the statutory stan-
dard). Under the Act, the EPA must consider the best available
scientific evidence to determine whether it "has reason to believe
that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States
cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger public health or welfare . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7415. As noted in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Administrator's
discretion to judge the effects of an air pollutant on the public wel-
fare is limited to evaluating "conflicting credible evidence." 415
F.3d 50, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting). It is not within
the EPA's purview to decide economic, national or international
policy; these properly belong to the Congress and were not ceded
to the EPA by the CAA.
The court below relied on the fractured majority opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA for the proposition that the EPA has unfet-
tered authority to regulate or not regulate air pollutants based on
broad policy concerns. R. at 11. Clean Air Act case law, however,
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belies this assertion. Indeed, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 29
(D.C. Cir. 1976), the court held:
[T]his is not to say that congress left the Administrator free to
set policy on his own terms. To the contrary, the policy guide-
lines are largely set, both in the statutory terms "will endanger"
and in the relationship of that term to the other sections of the
Clean Air Act. These prescriptions direct the Administrator's
actions. Operating within the prescribed guidelines, he must
consider all the information available to him. Some of the infor-
mation will be factual, but much more of it will be speculative -
scientific estimates and "guesstimates" of probable harm, hy-
potheses based on still-developing data, etc.1
That is, the EPA cannot make endangerment determinations
about air pollutants based on broad or nebulous policy considera-
tions neither related to the CAA nor enabled by statute. Where
the Ethyl court stated that the EPA has the power to make "essen-
tially legislative policy judgments," it did so only in the limited
context of apportioning weight to uncertain biomedical evidence
derived from several research approaches, not to decisions of
broad policy. 541 F.2d at 26.
Similarly, in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, the
court held that the EPA was within its discretion under section
115 not to make an endangerment finding regarding emissions al-
legedly causing acid rain in Canada only because it had a statu-
tory reason for doing so. There, the Administrator could not
determine which states were responsible for emissions causing
harm across the border, making the promulgation of an endanger-
ment finding "largely pointless." 912 F.2d at 1533. The facts of
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario and those of the instant
case are distinguishable, however, because of the different nature
of the air pollutants involved.
1. The "will endanger" statutory language at issue in Ethyl was replaced by
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger" by the 1977 amendments to the CAA.
42 U.S.C. § 115.
574 [Vol. 24
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss2/9
MEASURING BRIEF
C. The Scientific Evidence that Anthropogenic Carbon
Dioxide, Including That Generated Within New
Union, Contributes to Global Warming and
Endangers the Public Welfare of the People of
Inuksuk is Compelling.
At issue in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario were
sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions that are "converted, by chemi-
cal processes, into acids that, in combination with water vapors,
precipitate in the form of 'acid rain,' often many hundreds of miles
from their source." 912 F.2d at 1528. In ruling that the EPA was
within its discretion to decline regulation, the court cited contin-
ued debate "over the geographic areas affected by acid rain, the
types and extent of damage involved, ambient concentrations and
deposition levels, and the ability of scientists to identify the spe-
cific sources of the emissions." Id. None of these uncertainties are
relevant to carbon dioxide or the instant case.
Unlike acid rain, "final removal [of carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere] stretches out over hundreds of thousands of years."
NRC Report at 10. "If the average survival time for a gas in the
atmosphere is a year or longer, then the winds have time to
spread it throughout the lower atmosphere, and its absorption of
terrestrial infrared radiation occurs at all latitudes and longi-
tudes." Id. (emphasis added). Burning fossil fuels such as coal is
a "major" cause of the increase in ambient carbon dioxide. Id. In
fact, the power companies' plants are responsible for more than
five percent of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide released into the
world's atmosphere every year. R. at 6. The carbon dioxide emit-
ted from the power plants, unlike acid rain, clearly is present -
and present in appreciable quantities - in the ambient air of the
Province of Inuksuk.
The effect of carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas is equally
certain. The NRC report relied upon by the Massachusetts court
and the court below equivocates only on the level of precision with
which climatic predictions can be made, but its conclusions are
clear from the very first lines: "Greenhouse gases, such as carbon
dioxide, are accumulating in the earth's atmosphere as a result of
human activities, causing surface air . . .and subsurface ocean
temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising." NRC Re-
port at 1. A recent report by the ICCRP concluded that "the Arctic
region is experiencing some of the most rapid and severe climate
change on Earth." R. at 6. This is confirmed by a study conducted
by the Inuit Commission, which has linked the rapidly escalating
2007] 575
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Arctic temperatures to loss of sea ice, increased shore erosion, and
the melting of permafrost, all of which endanger the public wel-
fare of the Province of Inuksuk. R. at 5. Under the weight of this
data, it is at least "reasonably anticipated" that carbon dioxide is
causing harm to the welfare of Inuksuk.
D. The EPA Has Abused the Authority Conferred on It
by the Clean Air Act by Refusing to Require New
Union to Better Regulate Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from the Power Companies' Plants.
Carbon dioxide is a pollutant subject to regulation by the
EPA. Because carbon dioxide persists for thousands of years and
disperses globally, there is no question that the power companies'
emissions are present in the atmosphere of Inuksuk. The over-
whelming balance of scientific evidence indicates that anthropo-
genic carbon dioxide emissions contribute to global warming,
causing harm to the welfare of the people of Inuksuk as their
shoreline disintegrates and the permafrost beneath them dis-
solves. Under these circumstances, section 115 of the CAA im-
poses a mandatory duty on the EPA:
Whenever the Administrator. . . has reason to believe that any
air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger the public health or welfare in a foreign country...
the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the
State in which such emissions originate.
42 U.S.C. § 7415 (emphasis added). The plain language of the
statute requires the Administrator to give formal notice to the gov-
ernor of New Union to revise that state's SIP. SeeHer Majesty the
Queen in Right of Ontario, 912 F.2d at 1528 (the EPA alleges, and
the court agrees, that section 115 mandates that modifications to
a state's SIP are compulsory when the source of air pollution
which may be reasonably anticipated to endanger the public wel-
fare is identified).
Ideally, the Administrator should require the power compa-
nies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by fifty percent, consistent
with the best technology can now achieve. R. at 1. Section
108(a)(2) of the CAA directs the Administrator to establish air
quality criteria for an air pollutant to "accurately reflect the latest
scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be ex-
[Vol. 24576
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pected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air ......
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2). Given that the "latest scientific knowl-
edge" predicts rising sea levels and the susceptibility of much of
the globe to drought, a regulatory approach that leverages the
best available control technology is prudent.
II. THE TRAIL SMELTER DOCTRINE REQUIRES
APPELLEES TO REDUCE CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS TO LEVELS THAT CAN BE
ACHIEVED THROUGH THE APPLICATION
OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY.
The Trail Smelter doctrine, as noted by the court below, intro-
duced the Roman law concept of sic utere ut alenum non laedras -
one should use one's own property in such a manner as to not in-
jure that of another - to international environmental law. R. at
11. The Trail Smelter arbitration arose out of damage caused to
crops in the State of Washington by sulfur fumes which drifted
south across the border from a smelter in Trail, British Columbia.
The United States and Canada agreed that indemnification for
harm caused to crops was appropriate and established an arbitra-
tion tribunal to determine whether damage had in fact occurred
and what damages might be due. Trail Smelter (United States v.
Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1908 (1949). Damages were subse-
quently found and apportioned by the tribunal, and a second deci-
sion on the question of continuing (prospective) relief was
delivered three years later. Id. at 1963. In the second phase of
the proceedings, the tribunal noted that it could find no instance
of international law dealing with transboundary pollution and so
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decisions of disputes
over pollution between the states. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribu-
nal Decision, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 714-15 (1941).
A. The Trail Smelter Tribunal Applied U.S. Law to
Create a Simple Rule: No State May Permit Its
Territory to Be Used in Such a Way as to Cause
Serious Harm to Another.
Citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906), and New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921), the Trail Smelter
tribunal stated that transboundary pollution must be of a "serious
magnitude" and "shown by clear and convincing evidence" before a
court may rightfully intervene to settle the dispute. 35 Am. J.
Int'l L. at 714-15. In Missouri, the Court refused to enjoin sewage
20071 577
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discharge into the Mississippi for lack of proof that the harmful
but short-lived typhoid bacillus it contained survived long enough
to cause disease in Saint Louis. Id. at 525-26. Here, there is no
question that carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere by
power plants in New Union eventually pollutes the air of Inuksuk.
From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907),
the tribunal adopted the holding that "it is a fair and reasonable
demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory
should not be polluted.., from [a foreign] source." In that case,
apropos to the instant dispute, the Court enjoined the pollution of
Georgia's air by smelters located in Tennessee. Id. at 237.
Synthesizing these cases, the tribunal found that:
The above decisions, taken as a whole, constitute an adequate
basis for its conclusions, namely, that, under the principles of
international law, as well as the law of the United States, no
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
35 Am. J. Int'l L. at 716. This restatement of American and
international law supports each of the three consensus elements
of the modern customary law of transboundary pollution. First, a
state may not permit the use of its territory for injurious trans-
boundary pollution. Second, a state is liable for transboundary
pollution only when it is of serious magnitude and is shown by
clear and convincing evidence. Third, the tribunal suggested that
liability is strict if causation is shown. The questions presented by
the instant case are, therefore, whether the magnitude of harm is
sufficient to invoke the authority of the court and whether Appel-
lees are demonstrably responsible for that harm.
B. Pollution Generated in New Union Is Causing Serious
Harm to Inuksuk and Akuli.
The magnitude of the harm caused by the power companies'
emissions is certainly "serious." From a broad perspective, global
warming threatens the weather patterns of the entire globe, im-
posing costs and harm planet-wide. On a smaller scale, global
warming caused in part by the power companies' emissions have
left a major portion of the Village of Akuli subject to destruction
by flooding and erosion within three years. R. at 5. The cost of
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relocating the Village is estimated to be $260 million. Id. The
Trail Smelter dispute was settled for a mere $350 thousand. 35
Am. J. Int'l L. at 687. If the power companies are held liable only
for the approximately five percent of anthropogenic carbon dioxide
they contribute to the atmosphere, their pro rata share of this
harm approaches fifteen million dollars, more than forty times the
amount in dispute in Trail Smelter.
Causation under Trail Smelter presents a more complicated
question. Carbon dioxide both contributes to global warming and
disperses globally throughout the atmosphere. However, in both
the cases cited by the tribunal and in the Trail Smelter dispute
itself, the transboundary harms arising from pollution had uni-
tary sources and so there was no discussion of the type of causa-
tion required or whether joint and several liability attached to
environmental harm. Certainly, under at least some modern envi-
ronmental regulations, such as the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, joint and several
liability is strictly imposed.2 See O'Neil v. Rohm & Haas Co., 883
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding two companies jointly and sever-
ally liable for remaining cleanup costs at contaminated site after
other responsible parties settled). Trail Smelter itself, however,
presents little guidance as to how the costs of relocating the Vil-
lage of Akuli should be apportioned. Fortunately, the issue of
whether the power companies should be enjoined from further pol-
lution is much clearer.
C. Trail Smelter Recommends that the Best Available
Technology Be Employed to Reduce the Harm of
Continued Pollution.
The Trail Smelter tribunal emphatically stated that no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to create air pollution that harms the territory of an-
other. 35 Am. J. Int'l L. at 716. To prevent further harm to Wash-
ington by the smelter, the court compelled the use of available
emissions control technology. Id. at 726-31. After a multiyear
study tracking the diffusion of sulfur dioxide from the smelter, the
tribunal established a regime including instruments for determin-
ing both meteorological conditions and sulfur dioxide emissions,
2. The Trail Smelter is itself the current subject of litigation under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
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and also established minimum stack heights and maximum emis-
sions based on the season and weather conditions. Id. At the
time, limiting sulfur dioxide emissions meant limiting the activity
of the smelter. Id. at 726. If the weather was particularly unfa-
vorable, the operation of the smelter could be either limited or
halted entirely. Id. at 728-29. Thanks to advances in technology,
a more effective, less intrusive solution is available today. Al-
though the total elimination of carbon dioxide emissions cannot be
accomplished by modern technology, emissions can be cut in half
without interrupting the operation of the power plants. R. at 1.
III. IF THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS INAPPLICABLE,
THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL AIR
POLLUTION CAUSED BY CARBON
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS.
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I"), the Supreme
Court unanimously reaffirmed a state's right to bring a federal
common law action for the abatement of a nuisance caused by in-
terstate pollution. 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972). Illinois challenged
Milwaukee's discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan, a body of
interstate water, alleging significant public health issues. Id. at
93. The Court held that although "the remedy sought by Illinois is
not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress"
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), those rem-
edies were not exclusive. Id. at 103. The Court held that "when
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects,
there is a federal common law . . . ." Id. (citing Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971)). The Court remitted the parties to
a federal district court where the federal common law of nuisance
could be applied to the particular facts of the case. Id. at 107-108.
Congress subsequently passed major amendments to the
FWPCA, including the establishment of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). See City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 307 (1981) ("Milwaukee IT'). When the
case returned to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the
amendments preempted Illinois' federal common law remedy. Id.
at 319-20. The Court emphasized the comprehensive nature of
the amendments, which prohibit "every point source discharge ...
unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger
to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to
achieve its goals." Id. at 318 (emphasis in original). However, the
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Court left the federal common law intact as "a necessary expedi-
ent when problems requiring federal answers are not addressed
by federal statutory law . . . ." Id. at 319 n.14.
On the same day it upheld the federal common law nuisance
action in Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court held that "air pollution
is, of course, one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in
modern experience." Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S.
109, 114 (1972). The Court acknowledged in Washington that
Congress may preempt the federal common law of nuisance where
ambient air quality standards have been established or where
hazardous air pollutants have been defined. Id. at 115. However,
such preemption does not exist here. Moreover, courts have pre-
served common law remedies when no irreconcilable conflict be-
tween statutory schemes and common law remedies exists. See,
e.g., Nader v. Alleghany Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1978). Be-
cause no irreconcilable conflict arises when applying federal com-
mon law to the circumstances here, federal common law is
properly applied.
A. The Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt the Federal
Common Law of Nuisance Because It Does Not
Speak Directly to the Issue of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions.
"In determining whether a federal statute pre-empts com-
mon-law causes of action, the relevant inquiry is whether the stat-
ute '[speaks] directly to [the] question' otherwise answered by
federal common law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation
of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985) (quoting Milwaukee 11, 451
U.S. at 315) (alterations and emphasis in original). "[F]ederal
common law is used as a 'necessary expedient' when Congress has
not 'spoken to a particular issue."' Id. at 237 (quoting Milwaukee
11, 451 U.S. at 313-14) (emphasis in original). In Oneida, the Su-
preme Court held that the Nonintercourse Act did not preempt
federal common law because the Act did not speak directly to the
issue of remedies for unlawful conveyances of Indian land. Id.
While the Act provided that the purchase or grant of Indian lands
without a treaty or convention was invalid, it contained no reme-
dial provision. Id. at 238. The Act provided for criminal penalties
and gave the President discretionary authority to remove illegal
settlers from Indian lands. Id. at 238 nn. 10, 11. However, the
Act "[did] not address directly the problem of restoring unlawfully
conveyed land to the Indians, in contrast to the specific remedial
20071
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provisions contained in FWPCA." Oneida, 470 U.S. at 239 (citing
Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 313-15). Therefore, the Indians' right of
action under federal common law was not preempted by the Act.
Id. at 240.
In Milwaukee 11, there was no question that the FWPCA and
NPDES addressed the particular issues of effluent limitations and
overflows. 451 U.S. at 320. The Court held that "the problem of
effluent limitations has been thoroughly addressed through the
administrative scheme established by Congress" and therefore
there was "no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent
limitations than those imposed under the regulatory regime by
reference to federal common law... ." Id. Further, the Court held
that "all three of the permits issued to [the sewer operators] ex-
plicitly address the problem of overflows." Id. The permits identi-
fied the specific discharge points and the state permitting agency
imposed conditions, provided for detailed progress reports, and
brought enforcement action which was "specifically addressed to
the overflow problem." Id. at 321, 323. Thus, federal common law
was inappropriate because Congress had already regulated the
specific pollutants at issue and the regulations were incorporated
into the permit scheme.
In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, the Second Cir-
cuit held that a federal common law nuisance action was pre-
empted by the CAA on narrow grounds because the EPA had
specifically approved the power company's emission levels. 666
F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981). The court analogized the case to Mil-
waukee H in that both cases involved previously-approved emis-
sion levels for a specific pollutant - treated sewage effluent in
Milwaukee H and sulfur fuel in New England Legal Foundation.
Id. The court held that a nuisance claim was preempted because
the EPA had approved a variance to the state's SIP which enabled
the power company to burn fuel with a 2.8% sulfur content, the
exact pollutant challenged as a nuisance. New England Legal
Foundation, 666 F.2d at 32 n.1. The court left open "the broad
question whether the [CAA] totally preempts federal common law
nuisance actions," noting that "the [CAA differs substantially
from the [FWPCA] in areas which the majority of the Court in
[Milwaukee II] found especially significant . . . ." Id. at 32 n.2.
The court explained that the FWPCA regulates every point source
of water pollution, whereas, under the CAA, the EPA and the
states are only required to control emissions from those sources
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which they find threaten national ambient air quality standards.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(d)).
The federal common law of nuisance applies to carbon dioxide
emissions because the CAA, as administered by the EPA, does not
speak directly to the issue. The CAA, as well as New Union's SIP,
currently do not regulate carbon dioxide at all, let alone the emis-
sions from the power companies' plants. This complete lack of reg-
ulation stands in marked contrast to the regulation of sewage
effluent and overflow in Milwaukee 11, where those specific pollu-
tants were "thoroughly addressed" by the administrative scheme
of the FWPCA. New England Legal Foundation is also distin-
guishable because, here, the EPA has not approved a variance to
New Union's SIP that specifically addresses carbon dioxide emis-
sion levels by the power companies. Instead, the EPA has chosen
not to regulate carbon dioxide at all. Thus, a federal common law
nuisance action remains as affirmed in Milwaukee I.
B. Federal Common Law Is Properly Applied to Gaps in
Statutory Schemes.
Although federal common law cannot be used to impose
stricter standards in an area already regulated by statute, it
should be applied to fill gaps in a regulatory scheme. See Milwau-
kee 11, 451 U.S. at 324 n.18. In Milwaukee II, the Court explained
that by invoking a common law remedy, Illinois sought to create a
duplicate regulatory scheme that simply imposed stricter stan-
dards than the FWPCA. 451 U.S. at 324 n.18. A challenge to the
adequacy of the FWPCA "does not suffice to create an 'interstice'
to be filled by federal common law." Id. The Court noted that,
under different circumstances, a downstream state could invoke
the federal common law in an action where "permits under the Act
cannot deal with [the] subjects [at issue]" or where the challenged
permits do not do so. Id. Thus, where a statute does not speak
directly to the issue, a federal court can fill the gap in the regula-
tory scheme with a common law remedy. See id.
Federal common law should be used to fill the interstice in the
CAA for carbon dioxide emissions. Inuksuk and Akuli do not seek
a duplicative regulatory scheme that simply imposes stricter limi-
tations on the emission of carbon dioxide as did the downstream
state in Milwaukee 11. They do not challenge the inadequacy of
any existing carbon dioxide regulations because there are no regu-
lations to challenge. The EPA has declined to regulate carbon di-
oxide. As in Oneida, Inuksuk and Akuli seek a common law
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remedy the substance of which is not addressed by the CAA's reg-
ulatory scheme. Because the CAA and New Union's SIP do not
regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, this Court should fill
the gap with a common law remedy.
C. Federal Common Law Applies to the Uniquely
Federal Interest in Resolving International
Pollution Disputes.
In his dissenting opinion in Milwaukee II, Justice Blackmun
explained that "where federal interests alone are at stake, partici-
pation by the federal courts is often desirable, and indeed neces-
sary, if federal policies developed by Congress are to be fully
effectuated." 451 U.S. at 334 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (inter-
nal citations omitted). "Chief among the federal interests served
by this common law are the resolution of interstate disputes and
the implementation of national statutory or regulatory policies."
Id. at 334-35. Thus, Justice Blackmun recognized that federal
common law can serve two purposes. First, federal common law
can implement and fully effectuate federal policies by "fill [ing] the
interstices of a pervasively federal framework." 451 U.S. at 336
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Second,
federal common law can "assure[ I each State the right to be free
from unreasonable interference with its natural environment and
resources when the interference stems from another State or its
citizens." Id. at 335 (internal citations omitted).
In National Audubon Society v. Department of Water, the
Ninth Circuit mirrored Justice Blackmun's reasoning in the con-
text of a federal common law nuisance claim for air pollution. The
court held that "the Supreme Court has recognized the need and
authority of courts to fashion federal common law" in those in-
stances where "a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests' . . . ." 869 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 640 (1980)). Uniquely federal interests include "inter-
state and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights
of states or our relations with foreign nations . . . ." Tex. Indus.,
Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. The court in National Audubon Society ex-
plained that Milwaukee I "centered on an interstate controversy
which involved a state suing sources outside its domain which
were causing pollution within the state." 869 F.2d at 1205. The
court concluded that "true interstate disputes require application
of federal common law." Id. (internal citations omitted). Because
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the air pollution at issue in National Audubon Society was wholly
contained within one state, the court held that there was no
uniquely federal interest at issue and that federal common law did
not apply. Id.
Here, the federal common law of nuisance applies because the
power companies' carbon dioxide emissions implicate a uniquely
federal interest. The emissions cross an international boundary,
causing significant injury to a Canadian province and village. R.
at 6. As framed by the court in National Audubon Society, this is
a true interstate dispute. The international dispute at issue here
implicates the United States' relations with a foreign nation.
Thus, this Court should apply federal common law to abate the
public nuisance caused by the power companies' emissions.
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE
BALANCING TEST UNDER THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW.
The federal common law defines a nuisance as an activity
that causes an injury or significant threat of injury to a cognizable
interest of the plaintiff. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 72 (2006); Pu-
erto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D.P.R. 1981). The law of
nuisance is guided by the principle that "the right of the owner to
use his land is not absolute. He may not so use it as to create a
public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed
conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare." Penn. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
existence of a nuisance depends on whether the defendant sub-
stantially and unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs use and
enjoyment of his or her property. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 99;
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124 (1986). The essential
inquiry in any nuisance action is whether the conduct of the de-
fendant was unreasonable. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 73; see
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2001).
Courts have specifically recognized that activities causing air
pollution may create an actionable nuisance claim. 61C Am. Jur.
2d Pollution Control §§ 2034, 2036; Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal.
586 (1926); Gruber v. Dodge, 45 Mich. App. 33 (1973); Ferguson v.
City of Keene, 111 N.H. 222 (1971); Davis v. Izaak Walton League
of America, 717 P.2d 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). Liability for air
pollution will arise if the nuisance analysis finds that the infringe-
ment on the plaintiffs interest is greater than the benefits derived
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from the challenged activity. See City of Harrisonville v. W. S.
Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Sussex Land & Live
Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir. 1923); Moun-
tain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1906). The
determination of whether the defendant has acted wrongfully,
therefore, involves a BALANCING of the utility derived by the ac-
tions taken against the plaintiffs reasonable expectations of the
use and enjoyment of his property. See Carhart v. Gas Co., 22
Barb. 297, 308 (N.Y. 1856); Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen
96, 104 (Mass. 1866).
A. Customary International Law, as Part of the Federal
Common Law, Must Be Included in the Nuisance
Balancing Test.
When considering disputes of an international character, in
the absence of controlling legislative acts, this Court is required to
apply the federal common law. "[F]ederal common law exists [in]
areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States [and] interstate and international disputes impli-
cating... our relations with foreign nations." Tex. Indus. v. Rad-
cliff Materials, 451 U.S. at 641. The instant case directly
implicates the foreign relations of the United States. Inuksuk and
Akuli are located in Canada, and their claims center on the cross-
boundary movement of air pollutants. Any decision in this case
will have implications for the foreign relations between the United
States and Canada.
The federal common law includes principles of customary in-
ternational law. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court
held that "[w]hen the United States declared their independence,
they were bound to receive the law of nations." 542 U.S. 692, 714
(2004) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson,
J.)). The Court specifically held that international customary law
is part of the law of the United States. Id. ("The domestic law of
the United States recognizes the law of nations."); see also Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899) ("International law is part
of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice."); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) ("[T]he Court
is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the
land."). The Court also recognized that the law of nations includes
"a sphere in which the[ ] rules binding individuals for the benefit
of other individuals overlap[s] with the norms of state relation-
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ships." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715. These holdings create the founda-
tion for including the precautionary principle in a nuisance
balancing analysis.
The precautionary principle is a recognized rule of customary
international law. Customary international law is defined as that
which is "the general and consistent practice of states that is fol-
lowed out of a sense of legal obligation." Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 102, 103 (1987);
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). The fact that the
precautionary principle has been codified in a number of interna-
tional treaties is evidence of the consistent practice by nations fol-
lowed out of a sense of legal obligation. See Robert V. Percival,
Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Principle, 23 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
21, 24 (Winter 2005-06) (citing the Int'l Conference on the Protec-
tion of the North Sea, Bremen Ministerial Declaration (1984),
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty of the European
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts, art. 174(2), Oct. 2, 1997 (C 340)).
Most notably, the precautionary principle is included in both
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See U.N. Con-
ference on Env't & Dev., June 3-14, 1992, UNFCC, art. 3(3), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992); Rio Declaration on Env't and Dev., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) ("Rio Declaration"). Princi-
ple 15 of the Rio Declaration states: "In order to protect the envi-
ronment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation." The Rio Declara-
tion has been adopted by 178 nations worldwide. As such, the
precautionary principle is a binding rule of customary interna-
tional law because it constitutes a regular and consistent practice
of nations, followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
B. The General and Consistent Practice of the United
States and Other Nations Affirms the Application of
the Precautionary Principle in the Instant Case.
There is substantial evidence that the United States has
adopted the precautionary principle through general and consis-
tent practice. The United States has employed precautionary ap-
proaches in response to "mad cow disease in blood, diesel engine
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exhaust, particulate air pollution, tobacco consumption, and ter-
rorism." Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Com-
ment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory
Systems, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 207, 261-62 (2003). In fact,
federal courts have required the abatement of environmental
hazards where "the evidence calls for preventive and precaution-
ary steps." Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir.
1975). The United States has also taken a precautionary ap-
proach to environmental threats related to the atmosphere and
stratospheric ozone depletion. See Seth Cagin & Philip Dray, Be-
tween Earth and Sky: How CFC's Changed Our World and Endan-
gered the Ozone Layer 189-207 (Panthon Books 1993). These
responses to environmental threats, spanning several decades,
demonstrate the requisite regular and consistent practice followed
by a sense of legal obligation by the United States necessary to
adopt the precautionary principle as a binding rule of law.
Furthermore, the general and consistent practice of other na-
tions affirms the application of the precautionary principle in the
instant case. The Supreme Court has recognized that, even ab-
sent a consistent national consensus, the general practice of other
nations may affect substantive domestic law. See Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Roper, the Court considered the
issue of sentencing minors to death. In holding this practice un-
constitutional, the Court examined both the practice of the states,
as well as the practice among foreign nations. Id. at 551. Even
lacking an absolute national consensus against the use of the
death penalty for minors, the Court held that the practice violated
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 566. Significant to the Court was
the "consistency and direction of change" of the states' practices.
Id. at 575-79. The Court rejected the argument that the refusal of
the United States to join an international treaty prohibiting the
practice constituted contrary federal law. Id. at 576. In so hold-
ing, the Court gave substantial weight to the international con-
sensus against the practice. Id.
Here, the United States' use of the precautionary principle is
reaffirmed by international practice. As in Roper, the United
States has abstained from joining a treaty that mandates the ap-
plication of the precautionary principle, namely the Rio Conven-
tion. However, the absence of a controlling domestic statute is
overcome by a general movement toward a domestic precaution-
ary approach coupled with an international consensus in favor of
its application. Therefore, even lacking a definitive national con-
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sensus, the precautionary principle should be applied due to the
regular and consistent practice of nations.
Applying the precautionary principle as federal common law
would not implicate any of the reasons "for great caution" the Su-
preme Court has traditionally invoked to refrain from "adapting
the law of nations to private rights." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. The
Court has acknowledged that the "general practice [is] to look for
legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over
substantive law," and that creating law "is better left to the legis-
lative judgment." Id. at 731. Here, this Court is operating in a
legislative vacuum. A preemption analysis demonstrates that if
this Court agrees that the EPA lacks authority to regulate carbon
dioxide under the CAA, the legislature has avoided creating posi-
tive law this Court could apply. This Court may therefore look to
other areas in which law has developed guiding principles of law.
Customary international law may therefore be recognized to per-
form the balancing analysis to determine the existence of a nui-
sance in a transboundary pollution claim.
C. All of the Requisite Conditions Are Present for the
Precautionary Principle to Operate.
In order for the precautionary principle to apply, four condi-
tions must exist. A party must show that (1) the hazard is a "seri-
ous or irreversible damage" where (2) there is something short of
full scientific certainty, (3) where there are cost effective prevent-
ative measures, and (4) where the lack of full scientific certainty is
not a reason to postpone taking such action. See Percival at 32
(citing Per Sandin, Five Charges Against the Precautionary Princi-
ple, 5 J. Risk Research 287, 290 (2002)). The precautionary princi-
ple is operative here because each of these criteria is satisfied.
The hazard created by the release of carbon dioxide risks an in-
crease in global temperatures, which will have "serious or irre-
versible damage." R. at 6. While scientists agree that global
warming is a documented phenomenon, no consensus exists on its
full implications and long-term consequences. Id. Additionally,
there are specific, existing, cost-effective methods of reducing the
carbon dioxide emissions from the power companies' plants. R. at
1. Finally, the lack of absolute certainty is not a reason for delay.
The consensus of the scientific community is that global warming
will have profoundly negative effects; the only uncertainty is how
catastrophic they will be. Therefore, the precautionary principle
should be applied in assessing the balance of equities.
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D. The Precautionary Principle of Federal Common Law
Is Not Preempted by a Conflicting Rule of Federal
Law.
Federal common law applies unless and until a federal stat-
ute preempts its application. The EPA's failure to regulate carbon
dioxide under the CAA assures that the federal common law is not
preempted. A legal opinion issued by EPA General Counsel Rob-
ert E. Fabricant concluded that the EPA does not have the author-
ity to regulate carbon dioxide because, under the CAA, it does not
qualify as a pollutant. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a
Public Nuisance, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 293, 318 (2005) (citing
Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to
Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2petitiongcmemo8-
28.pdf); see also EPA, Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking,
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sep. 8, 2003) (adopting Fabricant's reason-
ing)). Therefore, should this Court agree with Mr. Fabricant, no
conflicting domestic law exists to preempt principles of interna-
tional customary law, and the precautionary principle should be
considered in the nuisance analysis.
V. THE POWER COMPANIES ARE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE
BECAUSE CARBON DIOXIDE POLLUTION
CAUSES INDIVISIBLE HARM.
A. The Landers Rule on Indivisible Harm Applies to Air
Pollution.
"Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to
produce an indivisible injury... which from its nature cannot be
apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdo-
ers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable
for the entire damages .... " Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Dispo-
sal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256 (1952). In Landers, the plaintiff owned
a small lake which he had filled with fish. Id. at 252. The plain-
tiff claimed that two separate pipelines owned by two individual
operators broke on or about the same day and that the pipelines'
owners negligently allowed saltwater and oil to flow across his
land and kill his fish. Landers, 151 Tex. at 252-53. Although
"there was no concert of action or unity of design between the de-
fendants in the commission of their alleged tortious acts," the
court held them jointly and severally liable for the entire dam-
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ages. Id. at 256. The court concluded that to hold otherwise
would make it "impossible for a plaintiff, though gravely injured,
to secure relief .. by joining .. all wrongdoers whose indepen-
dent tortious acts have joined in producing an injury to the plain-
tiff' where the injury "as a practical matter and realistically
considered is in fact but a single indivisible injury." Id.
In Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, the Sixth Circuit held
that the Landers rule applied under Michigan law to indivisible
injury caused by air pollution. 495 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1974).
Thirteen Canadian families filed a complaint against three corpo-
rations which operated plants across the border in the United
States. Id. at 215. The families claimed that the plants emitted
noxious pollutants into the air that damaged their persons and
property in violation of state and municipal laws. Id. The corpo-
rations asserted the defense that "other corporations, persons and
instrumentalities contributed to the pollution of the ambient air
so as to make it impossible to prove whose emissions did what
damage to plaintiffs' persons or homes." Id. at 218. The court
held that where "pollutants mix in the air so that their separate
effects in creating the individual injuries are impossible to ana-
lyze," the Landers rule shifts the burden of proof as to each pol-
luter's responsibility from the injured party to the wrongdoers.
Id. at 215, 218.
Similarly, the district court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
held Milwaukee jointly and severally liable under federal common
law for injuries caused by pathogens and nutrients polluting Lake
Michigan. 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607, at *22 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
The court found that there were multiple sources of the pathogens
found in Lake Michigan, including the sewage Milwaukee was dis-
charging into the lake. Id. at *15. It was impossible to demon-
strate that the residents of Illinois were infected by the pathogens
released from Milwaukee because "viruses and bacteria do not
bear labels . . . ." Illinois, 1973 U.S. District LEXIS at *16. Fur-
ther, the court explained that although Milwaukee's phosphorous
discharges might not cause a problem if they were the only source
of pollution, other phosphorous was being discharged and the total
amount of pollution was harmful. Id. at *22. The court held that
"anyone who contributes to the injury is liable, even though his
conduct, standing alone, might not have been sufficient to cause
the injury." Id. Other courts have similarly imposed joint and
several liability in multiple-polluter cases under the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. See, e.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385,
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411-12 (D. Del. 1905) (holding one of two factories that contrib-
uted to air pollution jointly and severally liable for the nuisance).
Thus, under federal or state common law, a polluter is liable for
its contribution to a nuisance even if the injury caused by its indi-
vidual acts is "inappreciable" and "it is probably impossible for a
person in the plaintiffs position" to show the polluter's share of
the harm. Id. at 412.
B. The Power Companies' Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Cause Indivisible Harm to Inuksuk and Akuli.
Although the power companies have not acted in concert or
with unity of design, they have caused an indivisible injury to In-
uksuk and Akuli and should be held jointly and severally liable.
The power companies operate five individual coal-fired power
plants in New Union. R. at 6. They are the top five emitters of
carbon dioxide in the United States and they account for over half
of the carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants in the
United States. Id. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas that con-
tributes to global climate change. R. at 5. The Inuksuk study
found widespread thawing of the permafrost which is found over
approximately eighty percent of Inuksuk. Id. The study attrib-
uted the thawing to global climate change caused by increased
carbon dioxide emissions, "consistent with the findings of most cli-
mate scientists." R. at 5. The thawing and resultant coastal ero-
sion and flooding have caused significant injury to Inuksuk and
the coastal village of Akuli. Id. To prevent the inevitable destruc-
tion of the village, the residents voted to relocate the village fur-
ther inland. Id.
The power companies' defense does not shield them from
Landers liability. The power companies assert, as did the power
companies in Michie, that they are only one source of carbon diox-
ide emissions and that there are numerous other sources. How-
ever, where carbon dioxide emissions mix in the air and their
separate effects in creating the injuries are impossible to analyze,
the burden of proof should shift to the power companies to deter-
mine the nature and extent of their individual liability. To hold
otherwise would make it impossible for Inuksuk and Akuli,
though gravely injured, to secure relief. It is realistically impossi-
ble for Inuksuk and Akuli to divide up their injuries from coastal
erosion and attribute the divided injuries to each individual power
company. Carbon dioxide molecules, like viruses and bacteria, do
not bear labels. Moreover, as in Illinois, the power companies are
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liable regardless of the extent of their contribution to the harm
caused by carbon dioxide emissions. The power companies, as the
top five emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, should be
held jointly and severally liable for the indivisible injury suffered
by Inuksuk and Akuli from carbon dioxide emissions.
VI. THE HARM TO INUKSUK AND AKULI IS
SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE TO PROVIDE
STANDING TO BRING A NUISANCE
ACTION.
The harm to Inuksuk and Akuli is sufficiently concrete to pro-
vide standing to bring a nuisance action. In order to show stand-
ing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a party
must satisfy three specific criteria. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1;
see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The plaintiff
must (1) have suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and partic-
ularized and actual or imminent, which (2) has a causal connec-
tion with the alleged conduct, and (3) that would be remedied by a
favorable decision by the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Because Inuksuk and Akuli have satis-
fied each of these criteria, they have standing to bring suit against
the EPA and the power companies.
Inuksuk and Akuli's injuries are sufficiently concrete to sat-
isfy Article III standing. An injury in fact is defined as an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or
hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The purpose of the immi-
nence requirement is to "ensure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative." Id. at 564 n.2. In the context of environmental
harms, the Supreme Court has held that the injury in fact require-
ment will be satisfied where the alleged conduct violates or threat-
ens to violate the plaintiff's aesthetic and recreational enjoyment
of his property. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972);
Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2004).
Alternatively, environmental injury can be "demarcated as a
traditional trespass on property or a tortious injury to a person."
Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1004 n.11
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Cop-
per Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2004)). The
proper consideration is the harm to the plaintiff, rather than the
harm to the environment. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
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Inuksuk and Akuli are uniquely situated to suffer substantial
injury from the power companies' carbon dioxide emissions. Ac-
cording to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004, a study
conducted by hundreds of scientists under the authority of the IC-
CRP, the Arctic region is subject to the "most rapid and severe
climate change on Earth." R. at 6. The Province of Inuksuk and
the Village of Akuli are located in this region. R. at 4. The re-
sidents of Inuksuk and Akuli are uniquely situated within their
communities to bear a significant, substantial, and unique injury
due to this climate change. Sheila owns a store that is situated
close to the water's edge. R. at 6. The rising water levels threaten
her property. Id. Additionally, John is a professional fisherman
who owns a wharf on the seashore, and whose sole source of in-
come is selling his catch to local residents. Id. Because rising
water levels are forcing the relocation of the town, John must en-
dure a disruption of his livelihood and income, and a loss of his
wharf and home. Id. These injuries are representative of those
suffered by each of Akuli's residents as a result of the power com-
panies' emissions, and a favorable decision by this Court will pro-
vide compensation for the harm to their livelihoods and
properties.
Here, the imminence requirement is not a bar to standing be-
cause the harms have already occurred. The "court must distin-
guish between a threat that 'may' pose an imminent
endangerment and a threat that is 'clearly impending" only when
no actual harm has occurred. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting Citizens for a Better Env't v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F. Supp.
2d 153, 1064 (C.D. Ill. 1998)). However, injury has already oc-
curred in the case at bar. The residents of Inuksuk and Akuli are
presently being forced from their village, their homes, and their
livelihoods due to the power companies' actions. R. at 6. There-
fore, because the harm is "actual," the question of the imminence
of injury for standing purposes is not raised by this case.
Nor is the question of standing conditioned on the violation of
an existing statute. "The relevant inquiry here is not whether
there has been a breach of [a statute], but whether [the defen-
dant's] actions have caused 'reasonable concern' of injury." Cov-
ington, 358 F.3d at 639; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528
U.S. at 183. The fact that the EPA has not regulated carbon diox-
ide emissions is not inapposite to finding a concrete injury under
Article III standing. The power companies' plants emit the green-
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house gas carbon dioxide. R. at 6. The climate changes resulting
from the power companies' conduct has resulted in "flooding and
erosion [that] will destroy a major portion of the Village of Akuli
within three years." R. at 5. As a direct result of the power com-
panies' actions, Akuli is forced to relocate, and the residents must
abandon their traditional way of living. This constitutes a con-
crete injury for standing purposes.
Moreover, courts have recently cautioned against "conflating
issues of standing and questions of proof." Taliaferro v. Darby
Township Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 189 (3rd Cir. 2006) (quoting
Society Hill Towers Owners Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 176
(3rd Cir. 2000)). For standing purposes, a party's assertion of in-
jury is sufficient where there is no showing that the "claims are
disingenuous or that the Residents claim [the] injuries merely to
manufacture a jurisdictional case or controversy." Rendell, 210
F.3d at 176-77. Rather, the standing requirement of a concrete
injury in fact will be satisfied if there is a "reasonable probability
of the challenged action's threat to [a] concrete interest." Churc-
hill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). Here,
the balance of scientific evidence has demonstrated the necessary
reasonable probability that the power companies' actions have
caused a direct injury to a concrete interest, and thus, the stand-
ing requirements are satisfied.
The facts of this case are analogous to those of Labauve v.
Olin, 231 F.R.D. 632 (S.D. Ala. 2005). In Labauve, the plaintiffs
brought a nuisance claim for the discharge of mercury. Impor-
tantly, in favorably deciding plaintiffs' standing, the court did not
"specifically hold that the mercury on [the plaintiffs] property
originated from [the defendant]." Id. at 651 n.43. The court held
that the plaintiffs had satisfied standing requirements, even
though mercury is a naturally occurring substance, and other lo-
cal or even international industrial activities could have contrib-
uted to the objectionable mercury levels. Id. at 646. Here,
Inuksuk and Akuli have alleged damages resulting from the
power companies' carbon dioxide discharges. Each of the power
companies engages in conduct that releases significant quantities
of anthropogenic carbon dioxide, which contributes to global cli-
mate change and proximately injures the citizens of Inuksuk and
Akuli. Therefore, Inuksuk and Akuli have proven an injury in fact
sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements.
Conversely, the facts here are distinguishable from cases in
which the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete injury. In
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Lujan, the plaintiffs argued that they sustained an injury in fact
due to the government's failure to apply the Endangered Species
Act abroad. 504 U.S. at 566. The Court held that, since the par-
ties had no imminent intention to return to the sites of the chal-
lenged projects, the failure to apply the Act did not harm them.
Id. at 564-66. Conversely, the effects of carbon dioxide emissions
have a direct and substantial effect on the residents' property and
livelihood as well as the environment of Inuksuk. R.at6. Inuksuk
and Akuli's injury has already occurred, is occurring, and will con-
tinue to occur into the future. R. at 5.
The facts of this case are also distinguishable from global
warming actions that have been dismissed for lack of standing.
The courts have dismissed public nuisance actions on grounds
that the purported injury was "within the realm of hypothetical or
conjectural [rather than] actual or imminent." Korsinsky v. EPA,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Specifically,
the court held the plaintiffs claims of increased vulnerability to
disease and mental illness due to global warming to be insuffi-
ciently concrete to merit standing. Id. However, in the instant
case, "[tihe injuries are not hypothetical because they have al-
ready occurred and will continue to occur." American Wildlands v.
Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (D. Colo. 2000). In no way can
these harms be considered hypothetical or conjectural. Rather,
they are actual, concrete harms that establish Inuksuk and
Akuli's standing to bring suit.
VII. CONCLUSION.
Ultimately, this case is about two issues: basic fairness and
economic responsibility. Inuksuk and Akuli, by operation of geo-
graphic and climatological chance, happen to occupy the portion of
the globe that is experiencing the first and most severe effects of
incipient global warming. The consequences of the unregulated
emission of greenhouse gases are being borne, if only for the mo-
ment, by them. Inuksuk and Akuli do not question the right of
power companies to operate coal-fired power plants or to emit
greenhouse gases, nor do they seek to prevent their future opera-
tion. Rather, they ask only that the costs of running these plants
be properly apportioned to those generating a profit from their op-
eration and that those companies conduct their businesses in a
responsible fashion that does not cause avoidable harm to inno-
cent parties.
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If the power companies insist upon passing the cost of con-
ducting their businesses to the innocent citizens of Akuli, it is left
to the EPA to impose a solution. If the EPA refuses to obey the
mandate to protect the public given to it by Congress and the
CAA, it falls upon this Court to remind the EPA that its duty
should not be shirked. If, however, this Court decides that the
global pollution of the atmosphere is beyond the scope of the CAA,
it must agree that there remains the long-accepted remedy of suit
under common law and the law of nations. While no one solution
will halt or reverse global warming, just as putting one criminal in
jail will not stop crime, the good should not be the enemy of the
perfect. Akuli is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg, and if Akuli
is allowed to bear the costs for others' unremedied pollution, it will
not be long before those costs are passed onto the broad sweep of
American society.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Appellants respectfully re-
quest that this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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